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Gordon Christie
Indigeneity and Sovereignty in Canada’s Far North:
The Arctic and Inuit Sovereignty

A century after excitement peaked around the

race to the North Pole and the drive to navigate
the Northwest Passage, the Arctic has reentered
the imagination of those living below the 60th
parallel. As temperatures dramatically rise, the
focus now shifts to “opening up” the region, with
debates swirling around questions of jurisdiction, travel and shipping, security, resource management, and environmental protection. Eight
Arctic states bordering or close to the Arctic
Ocean (Russia, the United States, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Canada, and Denmark
[in relation to Greenland]) dominate these discussions, not only in how these debates progress
but in how they are framed and understood. The
states bordering the Arctic Ocean, however, all
contain Indigenous populations, communities
composed of people whose lives, cultures, histories, and societies predate the imposition of the
nation-state on them, people who have lived on
the northern cap of the globe for thousands of
years.
The content and tone of current debates
about the Arctic are captured in Michael Byers’s
Who Owns the Arctic? which provides a window
into how certain kinds of language and ways of
framing issues and solutions can pull everyone
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into particular ways of thinking about fundamental matters.1 It is a text
that pays considerable attention to the Inuit living within Canada, highlighting both how they accept their place within Canada and how they can
act as potentially powerful allies in bolstering Canada’s claims to the Arctic Archipelago (ninety-four major islands and more than thirty-five thousand minor islands extending toward the North Pole from Canada’s Arctic
coastline).2 It is not misrepresentation to make these two points—somewhat surprisingly, given an early history of mistreatment, paternalism, and
exploitation, the Inuit across Canada’s north generally welcome their status
as Canadian citizens and do act willingly to assist in strengthening Canada’s
northern claims. Byers tells this part of the story, however, in the context of
other, “larger” affairs—the strategic positionings of nation-states in potential conflict over lands, water, and other resources; the concern over domestic and international security; and worries about how resource exploitation
and transport might pose environmental concerns. These matters emerge
as direct and vital concerns and interests of nation-states (clearly linked
to concomitant concerns of transnational corporations and other business
interests). Only when tied into the concerns of nation-states and their economic situations do we see expression of concern for the interests of the
Indigenous inhabitants of the north.
This sort of telling of a story within a larger framework—a larger
story, if you will—is the focus of this essay. My focus is on one word, sovereignty, that serves to ground meaning in the larger story and plays a central role in generating and upholding a web of meaning within which are
captured the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic. I want to examine how this
word works its magic and to suggest that another word, Indigeneity, not only
can help make clear how words and stories function in this setting but can
also suggest how Indigenous peoples of the Arctic—in particular, the Inuit
in Canada—can usefully meet stories with stories, words with words.
One might wonder, however, about the value in thinking about how
language functions in debates about the Arctic, given that the real problems seem to be around such pressing matters as the minimal regulation
of ever-accelerating resource exploitation, the significant increase in transit
of ships and cargo through just-now-opening routes, the pollution that has
already concentrated in dangerous levels in country food3—all manifestations of what one might think of as the looming threat of a second stage of
colonization. Yet the very fact that such a second stage is looming should
push us back into concerns over language.
Reflecting on how Canada has historically interacted with Inuit living
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within its borders illuminates both the first stage of colonization and recent
developments that might be characterized as moments of decolonization.
After paying little attention to the far north (other than ensuring that some
efforts were made periodically to bolster its claims to the archipelago), the
Canadian government began to get serious about the administration of the
north during and after World War II. Within the space of a generation,
tremendous cultural shifts were affected: families were pulled into permanent settlements, children were put in schools, Indigenous languages
began to slip, and the first lurch toward anomie was felt across the Inuit
communities. Things began to shift again, however, as a result of strong
1970s activism (and realization by authorities in the south that there might
be considerable wealth locked away under the Beaufort Sea and the tundra).
Modern agreements began to reconfigure the north. Today the Inuvialuit in
western Canada continue to work on self-government negotiations (twenty-
five years after settling land and resource issues), the Inuit of northeastern
Canada are continuing their efforts to work out a public form of government in the new territory created as a result of the Nunavut Land Claims
Agreement, and the Inuit of both northern Quebec and Labrador enjoy
comprehensive modern treaties. What began with a long stretch of benign
neglect, followed by a period of powerful paternalism, has recently led to
movement away from the centralist (south-centered) model of governance.
The new threat of massive intrusions by the Canadian government—
fueled by powerful desires for the store of resource wealth formerly safe in
the far northern vault—is only now building, as the second stage of colonization looms. Will the inflow of drilling rigs, mining companies, exploration camps, and all the other paraphernalia of the modern industrial
complex coincide with slippage back to a mode of governance dominated
by southern institutions? Here is where language—more particularly, discourse and narrative4—comes into the picture. Why would the assumption
be that the Canadian government could simply reassert control over affairs
in Canada’s Arctic? How did they assume this authority more than a century ago? How is it that arguments and debates around the opening up of
the Arctic all seem to function within a form of discourse that assumes the
sovereign authority of Canada and the other Arctic nation-states?
The key term, again, is sovereignty. The actions that would constitute
a second wave of colonization threaten disruption across the north, but
they happen only as outcomes of deliberation. If we limit the term action
to self-directed movement, then all activities in the Arctic are directed by
consideration and deliberation (a few tied to individual self-directed action,
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the vast majority being the result of collective processes). A tremendous
amount of investigation, assessment, and planning would go into decision-
making processes around a new wave of mass intrusion into the Arctic, as
those who already assume control (“jurisdiction”) over the region mull over
what courses of action they will follow. We can see how the potentially devastating actions of second-stage colonization will happen only as a result
of prior “cultural” activity (that is, through the mechanisms of decision
making at play at this time, in this place). It is within these mechanisms
that certain symbolic preconditions of deliberation operate—these are the
larger forms of understanding through which are made understandable the
sorts of thinking processes that ultimately lead to certain forms of action.
This schema allows us to marvel at how the processes of consideration and deliberation—conducted via the medium of language—may also
function to limit action itself. This idea expands on the hint above—that all
this has to be understood in a cultural sense—though in following through
on this expansion we inevitably slip into matters of politics. We begin by
noting that certain linguistic elements do not simply instrumentally assist
in the formation of plans and strategies, rather, they serve to define a range
of possible plans and strategies. One such key element is the term sovereignty. Quietly residing in the background, it provides a certain kind of conceptual structure to be applied to the very acts of investigation, assessment,
and planning. Not only are certain parties simply assumed to be vested with
the proper authority in making decisions that will affect all those who live
in the Arctic, but how these parties think and act are assumed to be the only
vehicles or mechanisms by which legitimate actions are first imagined and
then instantiated. Here forms of language and action outcomes are linked
together in a way that seems to preclude the sensibility of other ways of
thinking and acting.
Emerging from a particular history, the concept of sovereignty has
developed a core of meaning (surrounded by varying matters of ambiguity).
It captures the sense of a state’s enjoyment of “supreme authority within
a territory.” While the core attributes remain fairly fixed, varied theories
abound about the concept and its place in modern society. For my purposes the important points have more to do with how this notion functions
than with whether it is justifiable—or, indeed, dangerous—in the modern
world. The five nation-states bordering the Arctic Ocean assert sovereignty
over the landmasses, islands, and territorial waters that border or lie within
this oceanic region. In doing so they lay before the world claims that purportedly provide them “supreme authority” over these territories. Compli-
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cating matters is the fact that the Arctic is, essentially, an ocean—subject,
for example, more to the United Nations’ Law of the Sea than to the sovereignty of individual states that might have land within or touching on
this region.5 However, with the continuing expansion of territory to include
more extensive areas of water contiguous with shorelines—now extending,
in some matters, out to two hundred nautical miles offshore—sovereign
authority has come to reach into large parts of the Arctic Ocean.6
But what is it to enjoy supreme authority within a territory? And why
is this simply assumed to describe the nature of nation-state presence in
the Arctic—indeed, of human presence in the north? Before investigating
the latter question, let us explore the former, placing it within the context
of the Arctic and its apparently imminent opening. The states bordering
this region all lay claim to territory in the region, and on the basis of these
claims, they collectively exert control over all matters that fall within their
collective territories.7
First, sovereignty is understood as denoting territorially based power,
the ability to act in relation to defined lands (and not, for example, directly
in relation to persons, objects, or events). A nation-state holding sovereign power does so in relation to its defined territory and enjoys under this
power the highest degree of deference in relation to decisions it makes.
Second, all other decision-making bodies either within or outside this territory must accede to the decisions made by this sovereign power within the
scope of its territory. Finally, accession to decisions made by the sovereign
applies to all within the territory, generating obligations on all to follow its
commands—authority is conceived of as designating a right held by the sovereign to be obeyed by all parties.
In the Arctic, then, each nation-state with recognized territory is
assumed to have the authority to make all decisions in relation to that
nation’s defined expanse, where these decisions generate obligations on all
those within these respective territories, obligations that are also expected
to be respected by parties that exist outside this area. As a functional matter, then, nation-states act as if they enjoy the right to command obedience,
as if they enjoy the right to be obeyed (in relation to fairly well-defined subject matters, in relation to their respective territories). Collectively, then,
the nation-states of the Arctic act similarly in relation to the Arctic region,
with acknowledgment among them that areas on which they cannot lay
convincing claims will constitute open sea. Interestingly, it is not simply
a matter of nation-states acting as if they have the right to be obeyed—
both citizens and noncitizens act as if nation-states are owed obedience in
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this regard. In fact, what makes this structure function discursively is the
interplay between the various parties that collectively constitute the nation-
state—those parties who make decisions and those who not only abide by
them but who vest them with legitimacy in their acceptance of the power
that this structure generates and operates through.
This set of understandings, as noted, acts to backstop the mass of
other thinking about the Arctic—all the investigations, assessments, planning processes, and ultimate decision making run within a system of meanings built on this sense of who makes ultimate decisions over which territory. Given an emerging acknowledgment of the interconnectedness of
the region (its nature as an integrated ecosystem), there is a fair measure,
even an admirable one, of comanagement initiatives and arrangements. It
is essential to note, however, that the very notion of such arrangements—
for example, the presentation of current agreements as the promising lead-
in for stronger such arrangements in the future—is predicated on the fundamental assumption of the sovereignty model.
The rest of this discussion follows the implications of these basic
points down two paths. First, we explore what this implies for the Inuit
should they wish to resist the second wave of colonization by reacting
within the web of meaning built up around this fundamental notion. Second, we explore what this implies should the Inuit wish to challenge this
story as a story—that is, to reach up and beyond the level wherein sovereignty functions as a key element in a story being woven by nation-states
to a level where story meets story and where the Inuit challenge the notion
that this magical term can unreflectively act to channel all thinking about
action in relation to the Arctic.
Resisting Sovereignty: From within the Story
There are various options and techniques available from within the narrative spun by the nation-states, and the Inuit have already explored several
of these. The Arctic Council, an influential advisory and decision-making
body in the north, has evolved in such a way as to have a clear place for
Indigenous communities and voices. One can read from the originating
statement of this council the contours of decision making implicit in their
collective understandings: “The Arctic Council is established as a high level
forum to: provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and
interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic
indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic
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issues [not related to military issues], in particular issues of sustainable
development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”8 The declaration goes on to delimit membership (later making clear that decisions of
the council are made by consensus of the members): “Members of the Arctic Council are: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian
Federation, Sweden and the United States of America (the Arctic States).
The Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Saami Council and the Association of Indigenous Minorities in the Far North, Siberia, [and] the Far East
of the Russian Federation are Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council.”9 Over the last fifteen years, this sort of arrangement has accorded a
fair amount of indirect power to Indigenous peoples living across the Arctic; Indigenous communities have been able to discuss matters of concern
at some of the highest levels of nation-state decision making. It must be
noted, however, that this is understood as due to the largesse of the nation-
states. Only members of the Arctic Council make binding and authoritative
decisions (at times with input from Indigenous peoples).
If we begin with this model, imagining maximal impact from the
voices of Indigenous communities, what can we conceive of as favorable
outcomes for the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic? First, we need some
sense of the outcomes currently in mind. To narrow our focus, consider
what we can glean from the 2009 “Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic” (CIDSA). The Inuit Circumpolar Conference declares:
“In the pursuit of economic opportunities in a warming Arctic, states must
act so as to: (1) put economic activity on a sustainable footing; (2) avoid
harmful resource exploitation; (3) achieve standards of living for Inuit that
meet national and international norms and minimums; and (4) deflect
sudden and far-reaching demographic shifts that would overwhelm and
marginalize indigenous peoples where we are rooted and have endured.”10
These four goals capture the most pressing concerns of the Inuit. There is
clearly recognition of the direction in which things are moving: resource
exploitation is already accelerating, and so the focus is on the mitigation of
harmful resource extraction; economic development is the language of the
south, and so the focus on its sustainability; and a second wave of colonization is clearly visible on the horizon, and so the focus is on the devastating
effects of marginalization.
The declaration itself is an artful construction, masterfully pushing and pulling all the levers available in the sovereignty model. It speaks
of anchoring “the actions of Arctic peoples and states, the interactions
between them, and the conduct of international relations . . . in the rule
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of law.”11 The law it would have rule is that which was historically constructed by (and, some would argue, almost entirely for) the nation-state.
However, over the last five or six decades, this web of law has become
rather complicated, and it now entangles states and Indigenous peoples
in multiple strands of mutual obligations and responsibilities (on international, domestic, and subdomestic levels). The Inuit of the Arctic can position themselves—within the world built around meanings emerging from
these interwoven legal fields—as “a people,” as an “Indigenous people,”
as an “Indigenous people of the Arctic,” as “citizens of Arctic states,” as
“Indigenous citizens of Arctic states,” and as “Indigenous citizens of each
of the major political sub-units of Arctic states.”12 Each of these positions
comes with strong constraining bonds but also with strong pulls on not
only the consciences but the legal responsibilities of Arctic (and global)
state powers. The call is for the Arctic state powers to acknowledge the rule
of law, to accept the legal trappings that they themselves are bound by, and
to continue to build on the “intergovernmental relations” that the Inuit see
themselves engaged in when, for example, they sit at the table in the Arctic
Council. This view of the nature of such interactions (as intergovernmental) is not one currently embraced by the Arctic states, but the Inuit are
implicitly arguing in the declaration that this is a perspective they should
adopt, both because it accords with the direction legal and political instruments are tacking and it would simply make eminent sense.13
Key to the strength of this argument is the ongoing transformation of
the meaning and functionality of sovereignty within the international arena.
In positioning themselves as “a people” and as “an Indigenous people,” the
Inuit lay claim to forms of status that make serious calls on nation-states.
As a people they have rights under such international instruments as the
Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, while as
an Indigenous people they can claim rights now articulated under the UN’s
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).14 These instruments have effected tremendous change not only in understandings of the
“absolute” nature of territorial sovereignty but in the nature and growth of
international institutions. There is, however, some reason to be concerned
with the promise of a path laid out according to the constellation of signs
and symbols that still revolve around a fairly robust notion of “supreme
power” vested in sovereign nation-states.
By way of quick illustration, consider what many take to be the most
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important provision of the UNDRIP, a section that played a major role in
holding up a general vote on this declaration for quite some time. Article 3 of
UNDRIP is at the center of the CIDSA call for a closer collaborative decision-
making process between the Inuit and the Arctic states. It reads: “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.” This section would seem to signal quite a
shift in the distribution of legitimacy, allowing Indigenous peoples to radically challenge their place within states that may have colonized their lands
and communities. It must be read, however, in conjunction with a later provision in UNDRIP, article 46: “Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage
in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United
Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.” The sovereign authority of
nation-states is the assumed backdrop to these sorts of instruments and
is the background against which must be measured all attempts at resisting second-wave colonization within the conceptual universe laid out on the
basis of the sovereignty model. This does not imply that resistance of such
form is futile or that it cannot improve the lives of the Inuit, even in the
face of such looming threats. Resource exploitation, increased shipping and
travel, and general economic development will continue to push up from
the south, and resisting on multiple fronts—with weight on the rights of
self-determination being softly recognized—will likely mitigate the impact
of the changes this will bring about.15
I would suggest, however, that entirely distinct strategies are available—strategies of resistance that do not work within the stories told by
others. To explore these alternatives we first need to give some thought to
how particular kinds of stories can function to guide or control thought and
action.
Resisting Sovereignty: Story Meets Story
Imagine a people living within a self-contained normative universe. Such
a people live within a world of meaning issuing from both world-creating
and world-maintaining patterns—that is, how these people think about
their existence (the reality they inhabit) will result to some degree from
commonly shared (and collectively generated) patterns of thought and
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from universal norms and precepts reflected in and maintained by institutional structures and processes. Robert Cover argues that all meaning
is ultimately sourced in “commonalities of meaning,” patterns of thinking
and acting that define the community itself. These commonalities work
through our social body to “both ground predictable behavior and provide
meaning for behavior that departs from the ordinary.”16 But in the generation of meaning is created the very condition for an excess of meaning—
differences of meaning emerge, and social forces are required to maintain order within this sea of diversity. These forces of maintenance police
meaning, working to keep unified a community capable of diverse forms
of thought and action.
Narratives function, then, both to carry along commonalities of meaning and to police meaning. They are the carriers of meaning itself—the
stories we tell define who we are and how we think of the world—while they
also work to control what can be thought (and so what we can see as “possible” action). This picture does not suggest how such narratives themselves
might be potentially put to use—the picture is simply of the role that narratives play in constructing social reality around us. Nevertheless, the move to
their utility should be obvious—in some societies the availability of means
by which people’s very thoughts (and so their actions) might be regulated or
controlled will be noticed, desired, and acted on.
The rest of the analysis in this essay does not rest on any deep commitments to stories of manipulation or oppression by way of discourse.
Whether forces within nation-states mean actively and intentionally to
limit creative horizons through the deployment of larger frameworks of
meaning is not a concern here. Instead, the focus is on the fact that these
larger frameworks exist and function in this fashion, as without clear and
constant attention paid to this phenomena the Inuit can lose sight of the
second form of resistance to second-wave colonization, resistance that
meets story with story.
As noted earlier, sovereignty carries with it the notion of legitimacy—
the sovereign state acts as though it is owed obedience, while those affected
by the acts of the sovereign state act as though they owe obedience to the
state. There is a sense of “rightfulness” functioning in the mechanics of this
picture, as those who live within and through the larger story dominated by
the notion of sovereignty feel a normative pull, one tied to the sense they
have that the sovereign state is the legitimate source, ground, and site of
decision making over territory. In thinking about how one might challenge
this “rightfulness,” how a party might challenge the sovereign exercise of
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authority over a parcel of land, we can see the closing off of imagination—
the way rightfulness, legitimacy, and sovereignty function to police meaning in ways that in this context aggressively constrain both diversity and
creativity.
Contemporary challenges to the rightfulness of authority over territory would be couched in terms interwoven in the pattern defined by the
web of meaning generated around the concept of sovereignty. One might
argue, for example, that the nation-state in question does not enjoy jurisdiction over this piece of land (that it is controlled by another nation-state or
that it is disputed territory). Alternatively, one might argue that some other
legal interests intervene to temper the exercise of absolute power in relation to a particular subject matter (for example, human rights instruments
might be brought to bear on whatever the particular situation in question
might be, and pressure might force the state to alter its operations). Alternatively, one might argue that some factors in the situation might call into
question the standing of the decision-making authority as constituting a
sovereign entity.17 The first challenge is most common, as the lines on the
globe dividing up the territories of states are not so clear and settled as to
preclude disputes—witness the numerous problems swirling around both
lands and waters in the Arctic. Interestingly, the second and third are imaginable but are both uncommon and treated differently. The first sort of territorial dispute is understandable as a matter between recognized sovereign
entities, while the second invites challenges to the authority of a sovereign
state, and the third challenges the very identity of a potential “pretender”
to sovereign status. Though the sovereignty model makes sense of the
latter two sorts of challenges, they are properly seen as forms of conceptual
boundary issues; the second is tied to questions about how the “supreme”
authority of a sovereign state should bend to developments around things
like human rights—and other trans-state concerns now gaining some traction as able to transcend sovereign authority—and the third to questions
around how sovereign status itself is to be understood.
The key point is that all these cognizable challenges are understandable only within the sovereignty model. Imagination itself is constrained
within this model—our plans and strategies can reach out only this far. Are
there really no other sensible ways that the sovereign claims of a nation-
state might be challenged? The suggestion in this last section is that there
are indeed sensible challenges but that their sensibility emanates from a
very different vantage point. From this point, analysis is positioned so we
can clearly see that the sovereignty model is but one way of making sense of
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how people can think of themselves in relation to one another and to land.
That this vantage point can be reached only by way of the terrain of Indigeneity validates these sorts of challenges. It is the very fact of the Indigeneity
of the Inuit—of their status as separate meaning-generating communities,
living within other larger narrative structures they create—that makes this
sort of resistance both possible and appropriate.
Earlier in this essay, a question was posed about the assumption of
sovereignty by Canada over the territory it now claims in the Arctic. We
examined how the concept of sovereignty functions in this context but left
unexplored how the story generated around this concept came to dominate. A sketch of the story of the rise of this dominance suggests how
the Inuit can today meet story with story. It begins with the fact of base
or brute power. Over the course of the nineteenth century and into the
middle of the twentieth, the Canadian state engaged in acts it understood
as appropriate moves in the great game of international law, per other
nation-states—moves it took to be grounding in particular its claims to
the Arctic Archipelago. Exercising various forms and measures of de facto
power and presence does not by itself, however, ground claims—claims
are understandable only in the context of the rules of the game, the sorts of
things established by and through narratives. The acts themselves are mere
physical events—they become sensible as acts that attempt to ground sovereignty in the context of a web of meaning already there, providing a normative framework for the physical actions. Where and when do we look for
the genesis of this web of meaning?
In the context of the histories of the Third World, Dipesh Chakrabarty argues that the concepts lying at the heart of political modernity—
concepts that animated European Enlightenment through the nineteenth
century—had an odd life in the colonial circumstance. The European colonizer, Chakrabarty notes, “both preached this Enlightenment humanism at
the colonized and at the same time denied it in practice.”18 Speaking more
directly about the genesis of international law, Antony Anghie argues that
the universal imposition of a sovereignty model comes about as a particular sort of response to early matters coming out of the colonial encounter.19
In effect we could say that the current status of this model—its function in
maintaining limits on the imagination—is itself a colonial artifact. Faced
with the task of placing Indigenous peoples into the emerging international order in the early sixteenth century, the Spanish legalist Francisco
de Vitoria boldly raised the sorts of new questions this situation demanded
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but ultimately resorted to (then-)established ways of resolving key matters,
determining that while Indigenous peoples were capable of reason (and so
capable of self-determination), they lacked elements of civilization, shortcomings that prevented them from exercising self-determination in the
international arena (they were not considered as constituting polities akin
to nation-states). As Chakrabarty aptly puts it, the colonized were placed in
a waiting room, one they would never seem to be able to leave.20 This is a
sketch of the establishment of the base set of rules, which continue to dictate today who can “legitimately” make decisions over territory.
At the time early European intellectuals were constructing a discourse around international law—a discourse that would develop over the
centuries into a force controlling the very parameters of thought and imagination on a global level—the Inuit were living in the Arctic as they had
for countless generations. Inhabiting a separate normative universe, they
were engaged with both meaning generation and meaning maintenance.
In this universe, stories did not exist embedded in larger understandings
of “territorial integrity” and “sovereign authority over land” but rather
within accounts of land and people interrelations predicated on concepts
of responsibility and respect.21 The land itself was understood to be alive,
inhabited by all kinds of social entities, each of which demanded respect
and proper treatment. Within this larger normative framework, questions
about how people might interact with one another and the land and sea
around did not trace back to first-order questions about which body had the
rightful authority to make decisions in this context. First-order questions
would be about how one might act—they were about the appropriateness of
the action in question, not who might be appropriately positioned to decide
how to act.
This is not to say that the notion of “territory” did not exist in the
normative universe of the Inuit—different Inuit collectivities inhabited different areas, and boundaries (while not laid out with a surveyor’s precision) were known and respected. The difference is in the level at which
such notions functioned. In the story that developed within and between
emerging nation-states, questions about boundaries were fundamental, as
within this narrative framework once these matters are settled decision-
making processes are greatly simplified—the nation-state whose territory
is within these established lines is accorded authority in decision making
over this land. In the far north, territorial boundaries were respected, but
this did not fundamentally address questions about decision making. Deci-
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sion making happened in the context of narratives about responsibilities
and respectful attitudes—the model was not process driven but grounded
in substance.
As intrusions from the south over the last century became more
numerous, paternalistic, and oppressive, not only did the Inuit continue
to possess the narratives within which they lived, but more important they
maintained the power and authority to tell, retell, modify, and reconstruct
such narratives. Authority is itself a term finding its life within normative universes, so to say the Inuit continued to enjoy this authority is just
to acknowledge that they, as with other independent peoples around the
world, continued to build and maintain worlds of meaning about themselves, as the power to do so cannot be taken by another (short of complete
genocide). This power is at the heart of Indigeneity. This gets us to the heart
of this form of resistance, of story meeting story: the Inuit can tell stories
about their relationships to the land, water, and animals as alternate stories
about how decision-making processes should be understood, about how
humans should go about deciding how to act in relation to land, water, and
animals; and they can relate these stories back to the power they enjoy in
relation to their stories, a power that encompasses not only authority over
telling and retelling but also the power of critical reflection, modification,
and world adjustment. That is, in inhabiting a normative universe with
roots distinct from the cultural and social history of the West, not only do
the Inuit—in being Indigenous—have a stock of stories that meet those
of the sovereignty model as challengers in a contest over meaning, but
they also demand respect as a dynamic meaning-generating community,
as people who are alive and fundamentally self-determining.
How do two independent worlds of meaning come to interact? We
briefly noted, in the context of “international law,” how European powers
originally understood this task—they unilaterally considered how they
would interact with the other, and then acted accordingly. One might suggest that this approach issues from the core of their normative universe:
when faced with a weaker power, they tend to justify procedures and rules
that facilitate control over all matters of decision making (justifying this at
least to themselves, but usually in a manner indicating that they mean to
justify matters to the universe as a whole). Regardless, again, of whether
the intent was to dominate, the story unfolds as one wherein the European
narrative comes to dominate. The outcome is the world we now all find
ourselves inhabiting, for better or worse, where the model of sovereign
authority envelops all forms of discourse and action on the world scene. It
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is not clear, however, that an encounter between two normative universes
should be played according to a rule book used by only one side, and indeed
there are chapters in the story of the interaction between the West and the
other that suggest alternate forms of interaction.
Shortly after beginning their more serious attempts at gaining a foothold in what was to become eastern Canada, the French and British found
themselves in need of Indigenous allies (most often so they could wage an
on-again, off-again campaign against each other). This story is illustrative,
for it tells of a brief period in a certain locale wherein European power met
a more powerful other. This story is one of compromise, negotiation, and
the management of interaction according to rules that transcended both
normative worlds.22 Of course, once power shifted to the incoming Europeans, this period became an anomalous chapter in the longer story of the
European-Indigenous encounter. This is not to say, however, that it cannot
speak to contemporary settings, as its lessons are timeless. This all-too-
brief and ephemeral historical interlude illustrates how two independent
worlds of meaning can interact in a respectful manner. With differing narrative groundings, with different codes of conduct, different ways of thinking of human interaction and human-world interaction, two independent
worlds must construct a bridge between themselves, each side working
toward the other.
But can this be presented as a viable contemporary vision? The appropriate response is to inquire into what might be considered “viability” in
light of the fact of the Indigeneity of the Inuit. “Viability” cannot be determined simply in light of what one might think of as the reality of the fundamental dominance of the narrative of nation-state sovereignty over territory, as that is a reality that only maintains its “rightfulness” or legitimacy
on the basis of these very narratives—narrow stories that function to capture others within their grasp. We cannot be blinded by the fact of political and military power, for the question here is about deeper normative
structures meant to make sense of and justify these more physical forms
of reality. It is as viable in the here and now as it was centuries ago to imagine the need for a project of bridge building, of a form of dialogue between
normative worlds.
It cannot just be about the Inuit arguing for power within the nation-
state structure or for nation-state status, but rather it has to be about the
extension of sensibility out to an acknowledgment of the Inuit exercising their power in speaking of how they would structure decision making
over land. This power—manifest in “story”—meets narrative based on the
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magical notion of sovereignty, and it demands acknowledgment. How this
plays out is not for any observer—from either universe—to say. We see
slow movement toward a world wherein such bridge building again makes
sense,23 which makes it ever more imperative that multiple strategies of
resistance to second-wave colonization be contemplated. Given the way
that resistance within the universal story tends to be more about cooptation, this move toward challenging the dominant narrative—its presumption of universality, its way of closing off imagination—may be the only
route forward promising any sort of hope and security for not just the Inuit
in Canada but for Indigenous peoples across the Arctic region. How would
decisions about how the Arctic will be “opened up” be made if the Arctic
states realized that their claims to legitimacy were provincial and that they
had to sit with Indigenous peoples at a table not as decision makers inviting
input but as storytellers meeting storytellers?
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